From Post-Soviet to Anti-Soviet
The reintegration of the post-Soviet space based on old principles is beyond Russia’s capability and not in its interests. Rather, we are interested in seeing as many powerful and dynamic neighbors as possible, neighbors capable of assuming responsibility for maintaining regional stability
Picture: Gleb Bozov
Today the process of USSR’s transformation- or a “civilized divorce” of fifteen former Soviet republics that are now independent states- for the most part has come to an end. Despite the tension, we have been able to avoid a total disaster. For the most part, states have formed in the place of ex-Soviet republics. This is quite a unique historical phenomenon which requires analysis and understanding. How were those states formed? How was a new state machinery organized? What forces were especially influential?
Despite many significant differences, a common pattern of reconstruction of the post-Soviet states as well as the phases of that reconstruction, can be identified.
With one caveat: this does not apply to Russia. Although the processes taking place in Russia reflect these general trends, because of the country’s dimensions, its greater involvement in global processes, its powerful cultural and statehood traditions, these processes in Russia are much more complicated. So, this is why our scheme cannot be directly applied to Russia’s situation.
The First Phase: Nationalistic Regimes
After the collapse of the USSR, nationalist regimes were established in all of the states to some extent. These movements drove the collapse of the Soviet Union and laid the foundation for a new statehood. As a matter of fact, the republics had no other reasons other than nationalist ones for exiting the Soviet Union. The leaders of the new nationalist states were either party and Soviet republic leaders with nationalist slogans or leaders of nationalistic movements. The latter, which is quite illustrative, were representatives of the local cultural intelligentsia.
The principal features of this phase were as follows:
Separation from Russia, considered a symbol of the USSR and of ethnic suppression: “the external force that prevents us from living happily.”
Pro-western orientation. The West actively supported nationalist movements in the late perestroika period and influenced their revival and now is considered a primary source of support for the new regimes. Moreover, the new regimes clearly relied upon extensive economic aid from the West, which, however, they never did receive.
Diaspora Influence served as keepers of national identity and teachers of life. And also neighboring states with a similar ethnic make-up played an important role (Turkey for Azerbaijan, Romania for Moldavia, Poland for Ukraine and Belarus). Those countries influenced both the culture and the economy and bought out everything of interest for a song. Representatives of monied diasporas did the same. They tried to snatch anything they could to then resell without investing much in national economies.
National cultural revolution. The orientation toward internal ethnic patterns and alienation from Russia, in fact, led to a sudden cultural and national degradation. As a matter of fact, the impetuous transition from a higher cultural orientation to a lower (the cultural level of Moldavia was not any lower than the one of Romania, the same thing might be said about Polish and Galician influence in Ukraine) took place under the slogan of cultural national revival. This had immediate consequences: the reduction in Russian-language instruction led to a decline of the educational system. The restrictions imposed on the use of Russian in government undermined it from within since professionals, for the most part, were Russian-speakers.
While all of that was happening, the Soviet administrative economic system was collapsing. An abrupt decrease in living standards followed. The nationalist authorities only worsened the situation and was totally unable to build a new system.
Clan relationships and corrupt mechanisms played a key role in making cultural and managerial collapse possible. A brutal inter-clan battle for economic resources began which consequently turned into a power struggle. In some countries (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizia) the winners in the war were the authorities in power due to their own and their circle’s strength. In other countries (Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, and Moldavia) there was a change of power, sometimes as a result of rather violent and bloody events.
The Second Phase: Establishment of Corrupt Clan Regimes
The primary objective of the newly-formed regimes appeared to be a redistribution of the country’s wealth among the power-connected clans. All the rest turned out to be completely secondary. Property was brutally tied with power. The whole system of state rule served this purpose. In order to control the economic activity and financial flows, there had to be an administrative system. So, what had to take place at that time was the reconstruction of the destroyed state structure. To ensure constant financial flows, the country’s need to somehow develop its economy. In order for there to be opportunities to steal, the situation in the country had to be stabilized and the population’s standard of living had to stop decreasing. In its own way, the newly-formed corrupt clan system worked for stabilization and restoration the government and economic institutions.
The ideology of the newly-formed regimes grew out of their primary objective: to “split” financial flows.
This meant above all the sudden softening of nationalism and even fighting it. At that time the nationalist movements were competing with each other politically. Besides, nationalism hindered economic development and brought chaos to state reconstruction.
Secondly, this meant a rapprochement with Russia. The economic survival of the post-Soviet countries turned out to be quite difficult without Russia.
The new regimes were not as enamored of nationalistic as they were of financial flows that could be provided by Russia, its market and transit flows. Moreover, Russia served as a power guarantor of the new regimes. The policy of the new regimes, though, was not unambiguously pro-Russian. Neither Shevardnadze, Kuchma, nor Nazarbayev cared about the interests of Russia and at every opportunity they settled matters without consideration for Russia’s interests and even tried to threaten them.
Thirdly, it is weakening the Western influence, and especially, that patron states. This fit in quite well with the ideology of the new regimes. The West interfered too heavily into everything and caused unnecessary competition. As such, the clans sought to monopolize and limit access to resources for certain groups. The local clans decide themselves what to do and how to do it in the country which they took over and they were not going to listen to somebody’s advice if it were not backed by financial flows (which, of course, was not too tightly controlled).
The transition to a clan and corrupt model did not occur according to the democratic model everywhere. Very often at this stage in the post-Soviet countries the systems were focused on retaining state power, the irremovability of power elites, and no public participation. The public opinion here was either ignored or served as an object of manipulation. At that time Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Belarus turned authoritarian. However, in the case of Belarus and in part, with Azerbaijan, the rules of the criminal clan system substantially changed as a result of the transition to authoritarian power. The control over financial flows went into the hands of state and their redistribution was done through state institutions, not clans.
With regard to the Baltic countries, they went through this phase in a much softer way. The nationalistic leaders were replaced there by more moderate and less anti-Russian leaders. If official rhetoric suggested a rapprochement with Russia, it was felt not very strongly (almost all of the Baltic leaders made anti-Russian demarches from time to time), but economically, with Russia were getting much stronger.
The Third Phase: the Dismantling of Corrupt Clan Regimes
The corrupt clan regimes played their role in stabilizing the situation in the post-Soviet countries, initially by rebuilding their economies and their state. However, as soon as this process was complete, they became a substantial hindrance to national development. Power which was totally directed to redistributing property and financial flows was unable to fully resolve national issues. This was the case in the same way when the interests of nationalist groups at one time conflicted with the needs of the nation and the state. So now the interests of the clans appeared to conflict with those of the state. Regime change was necessary for the country’s development.
The criminal clan regime is based on close ties between property and power, so its main task is in keeping power in the hands of the same clique. The colored revolutions appeared to be the principle mechanism for changing the regime and dismantling the system. The term “color revolution” is frequently is understood as the involvement of external forces in the development of the post-Soviet countries. Here, however, the external forces only facilitate (in their own geo-political interests, of course) the unfolding of national processes.
The dismantling of the corrupt clan system, though, does not have to occur according to a revolutionary scenario. An evolutionary disassembling of the system is taking place in Kazakhstan today and from within. Although the example of Russia is not illustrative, the transfer of power from Yeltsin to Putin was a kind of Orange Revolution. Rather, this is the first phase of dismantling the clan system, though, which should be completed upon the transfer of power from Putin to his successor.
In fact, the tearing down of the clan system is a rather lengthy process, even in a revolutionary transfer of power. Far from all of the countries were ready for such a power transfer. So, Kyrgyzstan did not advance to the third phase, but rather returned to the first one. Georgia had big problems. Here it was mainly nationalism which impeded the development of a full-fledged national state.
As is the case with authoritarian regimes (Belarus and Azerbaijan), the third phase is not connected with dismantling the clan and corrupt system but is rather connected with an authoritarian system of state-controlled distribution. That is, its base is modernization and economic liberalization. It is quite charcteristic that the current five-year plan Lukashenko proclaimed to be “a five-year plan to create a business class”.
Those countries which still remain in the second phase have many problems today and the situation there is the least predictable and most explosive. It applies equally to both democratic Armenia and authoritarian Uzbekistan. The most complicated situation appears to be in Turkmenistan that lost its leader and had no successor nor a democracy.
Another important feature of post-Soviet evolution is overcoming nationalism. Countries developing most successfully now are those that have moved away from nationalist ideology away. The main menace of nationalism consists in its substituting the state objectives with nationalist. Thus, for example, a way out of the current complicated situation for Georgia, with regions populated with Azeris and Armenians in addition to Abkhazia and Southern Ossetiya, would be to establish a confederation (with a possible re-establishment of its statehood). Nationalist goals, however, require quite the opposite: using state and national resources for returning its territories, which is fraught with bloodshed and crisis.
The general trend in overcoming nationalism in post-Soviet states is clear, however. The complete dismantling of the corrupt clan system and overcoming nationalism would mean breaking out of the limits of post-Soviet politics.
The USSR is Alive and Well
The Soviet Union collapsed completely and irreversibly, and no common space can or should arise in place of the former superpower. Statements of this kind, however, should be made with a number of “ifs.” As a rule, the arguments on this subject are based on historical similarities: the histories of collapse of other large empires. However, the fact that the USSR collapsed under different historical circumstances is easily ignored. When it ended, the Soviet Union was at a qualitatively different level of development, unlike any other empire of the past.
The Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires, for example, collapsed in such a way that the majority of their citizens may not have even noticed. A peasant or a craftsman does not care about whether he lives in an empire or in one of its shards. It was quite another matter for the USSR. The level of its technological development was so high that its collapse affected too many. While it was a collapse, the information, transportation, energy, and technology space was still shared. Leaving that shared space was possible only barbarically way. For example, in Turkmenistan in the last few years there has been an intentional reduction of health care services and public education. The leadership of Turkmenistan- that earlier set a task of achieving complete neutrality- has been consistently trying to pull the country out of the common space, without counting losses. The result is predictable: the collapse of social services. Where else can one find dozens of thousands of teachers and doctors who do not speak nor think in Russian? But even in that situation, the state remained integrated in a shared transportation network, since a leaving it would mean a total national suicide.
Russia is still being kept from its collapse in the same way by, say, its nuclear complex. And it is not because nuclear weapons effectively defend it from enemies but rather because the smaller parts would not be able to keep the nuclear complex functioning. And what will a disruption of this most complex system mean for those who live in Russia? Dozens of Chernobyls, black-outs, and mass layoffs of highly-qualified employees. Any technically complex system keeps the post-Soviet space from complete disintegration today. Otherwise it will inevitably lead to a deep decline in living standards, quality of life, and will jeopardize the survival of nations. The technological infrastructure will keep a common post-Soviet space from its disintegration and will stimulate attempts for its reunification yet for several decades.
The USSR is Dead
Putting aside the question of the Soviet ideology, do we need a real unification of the Soviet Union? It looks like today Russia cannot afford it and does not want it. Perhaps, the re-integration of Russia and Kazakhstan is possible? The conditions under which Russia would be willing to do it would not suit Kazakhstan and vice versa. Astana will never agree with the role that Moscow is going to assign it. Another, more complicated option would be Moscow starting an integration process with Kirghizia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, the countries most inclined to reunify with Russia. Kazakhstan will not be able to avoid such reintegration as it could lose key decision-making authority. This means that Central Asia cannot “be taken” by parts but only as a whole.
That process would require economic resources on a scale which Russia today cannot marshal. At least, it is impossible to do this within the framework of the current economic model. In today’s Russia there are such tremendous disparities in income that it now impossible to have a well-integrated society. The Central Asian republics have such low standards of living that reintegration of the poorest regions would be impossible (without a tremendous transfer of material resources to that region).
The reintegration of the Transcaucasia requires less economic but more military and political resources. First, because of a number of simmering conflicts that will need to be somehow resolved. Secondly, because regional elites will claim a higher status in the common empire than Russia will be willing to accord.
And this is not even taking Ukraine into account. Incorporating it will require both immense economic investments (there are 50 million people). This is quite apparent in the natural gas disputes, and the political concessions to local elites which are of no less significant.
We cannot speak of reintegration of the Baltic republics. Under the current conditions it is totally impossible.
Anti-Soviet Policy
Today Russia is interested in seeing the former Soviet republics develop more dynamically and assume more responsibility for stabilization and development of the common space and adjoining territories, while retaining a common technological and cultural space. The more powerful each country is, the more benefits this will bring all concerned.
Of course, such a strategy has its own drawbacks. Each country has its own interests and some of them are go against Russia’s. However, nothing can be done here: one has to pay the price for the giving up the burden of being an empire.
Russia will continue its anti-Soviet policy. The principal objective of that course of action is seeing that the ex-Soviet republics become self-sustaining and give up a post-Soviet policy of using territorial, historical and other claims to parasitize on Russian resources. This kind of policy is carried out by the most the post-Soviet states.
The Baltic republics (together with Poland) are attempting to use their membership in the Euro-Atlantic institutions to pressure Russia secure preferential treatment in trade and to emphasize their own significance for the West in the hope of gaining more benefits. The Ukraine blackmails by threatening to exit and with its control over Russian natural gas transiting through it. Georgia is playing a similar game. Belarus is selling itself as a military and political barrier of NATO and blackmails with the transit of natural gas (it would do the same thing if it had a NATO membership). The rest of the countries have fewer resources to pressure Russia but such attempts are constantly being made. A truly independent development policy is conducted by a very small number of countries.
First of all, it is Kazakhstan. Many people criticize Astana for moving out of the zone of Russian influence, by planning the construction of a pipeline that will bypass Russia, selling hydrocarbons to China. But that type of self-sustaining and strong Kazakhstan is more preferable to Russia rather than a weak and non-self-sustaining Kazakhstan demonstrating its dubious participation in an area of mythic Russian influence. The leadership of the post-Soviet states must understand that by carrying out a post-Soviet policy when the focus is on the post-Soviet space, they doom their countries to stagnation. Russia is not interested in those countries’ lounging within the former Soviet space but is interested in these states developing and playing a more important role on a global scale. The might and influence of the whole post-Soviet space will increase. Such self-sustaining development requires certain efforts without which the former republics of the USSR will not become true states.
